Abstract
There are two opposed tendencies in the interpretation of the good will: the interpreters consider either the valueof the gifts of nature and fortune in isolation or apart from their combination with a good will or the value of the good will completely apart from its relation to the gifts. I dealt with the first interpretative tendency in a previous paper. Here I draw some implications from my thesis of the primacy of the good will in order to deal with the second interpretative tendency, which can be seen in authorized Kant’s interpreters, such as Karl Ameriks and Allen Wood.
Highlights
In the opening paragraphs of the Groundwork, Kant is not dealing so much with the distinction between different senses of ‘good’, but with the relationship between determinate qualities and properties (the gifts of nature and fortune) and a determinate entity or substance, namely, the good will
Ameriks could reply that, given that Kant “does allow that properties such as talents and temperaments can have some moral value (a ‘qualified’ value, to be sure) as long as they are founded in a good will [,] what is still unclear, though, is what the original reason is for affirming this claim rather than saying that a will is good only when grounded in an ‘objective’ nature that is kind, not stupid, etc.” 14
As far as I understand, Kant only says that the gifts of nature and fortune must be combined with a good will in order to be taken for good
Summary
In the opening paragraphs of the Groundwork, Kant is not dealing so much with the distinction between different senses of ‘good’, but with the relationship between determinate qualities and properties (the gifts of nature and fortune) and a determinate entity or substance, namely, the good will.
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