Abstract
Abstract This chapter explores some empirical results bearing on the descriptive and normative adequacy of different accounts of causal learning and representation. It begins by contrasting associative accounts with accounts that attribute additional structure to causal representation, arguing in favor of the latter. Empirical results supporting the claim that adult humans often reason about causal relationships using interventionist counterfactuals are presented. Contrasts between human and nonhuman primate causal cognition are also discussed, as well as some experiments concerning causal cognition in young children. A proposal about what is involved in having adult human causal representations is presented and some issues about how these might develop over time are explored.
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