Some Determining Factors in Soviet-Japanese Relations

Abstract

T HE STRAINED ATMOSPHERE created by the September I976 MIG incident and by a dispute over territory and fishing rights early in I977 led some observers to predict a serious deterioration in SovietJapanese relations. That they were unduly pessimistic was shown late in the spring of I977 when and Moscow signed an interim agreement regulatingJapanese fishing in the Soviet 200-mile economic zone and a new five-year trade and payments agreement. In fact, what has been most noteworthy about Soviet-Japanese relations in the past two decades is not such vacillations but strong underlying continuity. While long-standing Japanese mistrust of the U.S.S.R. and persistent Soviet intransigence on the territorial issue have prevented any dramatic improvement in relations, the growing economic interdependence of the two countries has also made a serious breakdown unlikely. This article examines the factors that have produced this basic continuity, focusing in the final section on recent developments and their implications for Soviet-Japanese relations in the late I970's. One major obstacle on the Japanese side to a significant improvement in relations has been mistrust of Soviet strategic aims. In part, this is rooted in memories of historical conflicts. Equally important, for the Japanese military the U.S.S.R. now represents really the only plausible threat. Japanese planes have to scramble almost daily to challenge the Tokyo express-Soviet planes approaching Japanese territorial skies. Even before September 6, I976 when a defecting MIG-25 penetrated Japanese air defences to land in Hokkaido, a Japanese Defence Agency (J. D. A.) study warned that the recent transfer of MIG-25's to the Soviet Far East necessitated an improvement in Japan's air defences.1 Increasing Soviet naval strength and activities in the waters around the Japanese islands have also persuaded the Japanese maritime self-defence forces of the need to im-