Some Basic Methodological Considerations of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit

Abstract

Where are we after all this? Sextus Empiricus posed some fundamental challenges to epistemological realism and to the possibility of its defense. Descartes failed to defend epistemological realism. Kant both failed to refute epistemological realism and to defend his own form of “empirical realism.” Carnap failed to dissolve the issue of epistemological realism. Alston’s proposals for justifying epistemic principles are modest, at best. So far, then, no adequate solution has been found to the problems of justifying epistemic principles and of settling disputes within epistemology. Sextus Empiricus’s charges of circularity, question-begging, and dogmatism still remain salient. Worse yet, Hegel has challenged the presumption that transcendental knowledge (second-order knowledge about what empirical knowledge is) is any less problematic or available than empirical knowledge. How could epistemological realism be defended or even examined under such conditions?