Some aspects of eloquence in Descartes's works

Abstract

In Descartes's philosophy, communicating scientific and philosophical truth does not represent a problem that can be traced back to humanistic “rhetoric”, meant as “the art of persuasion”. Descartes states his belief in the “eloquence” of reason: a clear, precise, and adequately expressed thought cannot fail to “convince” the listener. This is the measure of the distance between the level of truth and the level of opinion. However, the moment of confrontation with the public is also the very moment when the truth of the new knowledge enters into conflict with other, different conceptions. Education and history influence communication with the result that the distinction between intellectual “conviction” and “persuasion” becomes less straightforward. Rational eloquence, as Descartes is well aware, must be articulated in such a way as to avoid any possible language equivocation and to adopt exposition strategies ensuring effective access to readers. The aim of this paper is to illustrate some aspects of this tension as expressed by the writer Descartes with reference to a number of texts (from the Regulae to the Meditationes) that were essential for the elaboration and dissemination of his philosophy.