Abstract
In this chapter the classical form of skeptical argument, based on skeptical hypotheses, is presented. Then a contextualist response to the problem of skepticism, built upon the “Rule of Sensitivity,” is explained, defended, and shown to be superior to other solutions, including other contextualist solutions, Nozick’s solution, and, especially, skeptical solutions. It is argued that the best conclusion we can draw from the skeptic’s argument is that we are not ordinarily mistaken when we claim or ascribe knowledge, despite the best efforts of the “bold skeptic” to show that we are. Rather, the main insights to be rationally drawn from a study of the skeptic’s argument involve the context-sensitivity of attributions of knowledge, and the role that the Rule of Sensitivity plays in changing the epistemic standards that govern these attributions.
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