Abstract
Punishment of non-cooperators—free riders—can lead to high cooperation in public goods games (PGG). However, second-order free riders, who do not pay punishment costs, reduce the effectiveness of punishment. Here we introduce a “leader support system,” in which one group leader can freely punish group followers using capital pooled through the support of group followers. In our experiment, participants engage in three stages repeatedly: a PGG stage in which followers decide to cooperate for their group; a support stage in which followers decide whether to support the leader; and a punishment stage in which the leader can punish any follower. We compare a support-present condition with a no-support condition, in which there is an external source for the leader’s punishment. The results show that punishment occurs more frequently in the support-present condition than the no-support condition. Within the former, both higher cooperation and higher support for a leader are achieved under linkage-type leaders—who punish both non-cooperators and non-supporters. In addition, linkage-type leaders themselves earn higher profits than other leader types because they withdraw more support. This means that leaders who effectively punish followers could increase their own benefits and the second-order free rider problem would be solved.
Highlights
Punishers’ reputations) and there is no sufficient answer yet
The authors mathematically show that the pool punishment system is more stable than peer punishment only when the system punishes both the first- and second-order free riders
The authors report that systems with second-order punishment increase the number of people bearing the punishment cost, and high cooperation is likely compared to the condition with only first-order punishment
Summary
Punishers’ reputations) and there is no sufficient answer yet. an anthropological survey showed that punishment between individuals is rare in a small society, which is similar to an evolved environment[15]. Under the leader support system, a leader can obtain more support and profit by executing both the first- and second-order punishment, which results in high cooperation in PGG. We attempt to demonstrate for the first time that a linkage punishment leader appears under the leader support system, which makes it easier to achieve high cooperation in the PGG.
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