Abstract
This chapter illustrates how the Frege cases pose major problems for language of thought (LOT) due to its neo-Russellian semantics that directly oppose its symbolic view of thinking. If this criticism is accepted, the soundness of any theory of psychological explanation based on neo-Russellianism will be put into question. In response to this and other criticisms of LOT, it is argued that the Frege cases are not genuine counterexamples to intentional laws because they can be included in the ceteris paribus clauses of the relevant laws. The presence of ceteris paribus clauses means that a case need not be a counterexample if the antecedent of a special science law is satisfied but the consequent is not. Such a case may be considered to be a “tolerable exception” because the ceteris paribus conditions fail to hold. In order for a case to be considered a counterexample, the antecedent must obtain and the ceteris paribus condition must be met.
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