Abstract
In this paper, we shall discuss solution concepts for coalitional games in constructing networks. We define the demand allocation using a concept of the demand operation which was defined in our previous paper. A sufficient condition that demand allocations belong to the core of coalitional games in constructing networks has been shown. By using this theorem, we have obtained a sufficient condition for the core of coalitional games in constructing networks with public vertices to be nonempty.
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