Soft gender diversity regulations for boards of directors: the moderating role of firm ownership and control structure

Abstract

ABSTRACT Women are significantly underrepresented worldwide on corporate boards of directors, leading to board gender diversity regulations. Drawing from agency and socioemotional wealth theories, we investigate the moderating effect of ownership structure, shareholder identity and shareholder control on how gender diversity codes and soft quotas influence women’s representation on boards. We analyse our sample of Spanish Stock Exchange firms using panel data Tobit models. The results show that a single large shareholder enhances the positive impact of regulations, while multiple blockholders diminish it. Blockholder identity also matters: family control of board seats and families as the sole large shareholders reduce the positive impact of board gender diversity regulations on women’s board representation. In family firms, the balance of power between family and non-family shareholders also affects the impact of regulations. Our findings highlight the need to consider firm ownership and control structure when developing regulations to promote board gender diversity.