Socrates’ Conception of Piety

Abstract

For Socrates, philosophy is self-examination. If the Euthyphro is still to be philosophy in this sense, it must challenge people living now. This paper offers a reading that does this. First, a better case is made for something like the kind of expertise Euthyphro claims and for his position about piety. Second, Socrates and Euthyphro embody different views about the kind of expertise that would be relevant to discovering and engendering piety. Finally, Socrates’ unorthodox conception of piety is made explicit. With these features highlighted, the Euthyphro still possesses the power to provoke and challenge. The Euthyphro is one of the most frequently used texts in introductory philosophy classes. But I think it is commonly undertaught. So, when an issue of Teaching Philosophy arrived a few years ago with an article by Robert Talisse on teaching the Euthyphro, I knew right away that I had to read it. Talisse has written articles that I admire. But I was disappointed. There are, I think, two basic sources of disappointment. First, Talisse proposes a dialogical reading of the Euthyphro, but his reading focuses on the dialogue within the text, largely ignoring the dialogue between the text and the reader. But for Socrates, philosophy is self-examination. So, if any philosophy in the Socratic sense is to happen today in connection with the Euthyphro, it must result from a dialogue between the text and us. Second, for Talisse, the Euthyphro is about different kinds of experts. While I agree that the issue of kinds of expertise is centrally involved, I thought the dialogue was about piety. Moreover, it seems that the kind of expertise that is relevant to piety might well depend on what piety is. Let’s take these two concerns in order. Philosophy and the Euthyphro The Socrates of the Apology at least is, as he himself proclaimed, a “gadfly” (30e), a questioning examiner of lives who aimed to arouse