Abstract

“Constitutive phenomenology of natural attitude” of A. Schutz, phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology have been interpreted or criticized in various ways. Usually, these are considered to be “subjective” approaches.What is then a “subjective” approach ? Does is presuppose the “subjective-objective” shema, which is so for widely dominated in sociology ? Is it simply opposed to “decentered” approach ? Can it not make clear the “intersubjective” world of our daily life ?-these are the questions that will be examined in this paper.First, the gap of“transcendental” and “mundane” sphere in Schutz's will be revealed with the examination of some critiques on them. His peculiarity in sociology will thus be resognized. Secondly, the ambiguity of “Ich” in Husserl's phenomenology and the significance of method of Epoché-Husserlian “Radikalism” will be explained will the writer's attention to the differences of Husserl und Schutz concerned with the problem of “intersubjectivity”. Finally, the consequence that schutz's theouy of “intersubjectivity” has given on the development of phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology will be refered to and it will be proved that thest “subjective” approaches have different aspects which cannot be grasped by the traditional “subjective-objective” shema.Schutz has discovered the problem of “intersubjectivity”, which has been so far entirely neglected, and thereby he has thematized it as “sociological” problem, nat as “philosophical” one. It is a contribution that Schutz has made to sociology. And in the development of these theories, where the opposition of “subjective-objective” has proved to be of no effect, the “meaning” of “Ich” (= Subjectivity) has varied by degrees.

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