Sociology and Social Movements

Abstract

The relationship between sociology and social movements can be conceptualized in a variety of ways, both and normative. First, we want to argue for pragmatic usefulness of distinguishing between and matters, and then give some examples for how sociological research on social movements might proceed. Since, frequently, activist arguments against doing sociology as a are grounded on misunderstandings about what science is, we next discuss some recent evidence for manifest cultural disunity of science. We close with Nietzschean point that decision for as opposed to activism or morality, rlot itself a scientific decision. It useful to keep separate different ways of thinking about relationship between sociology and social movements, including distinction between and matters. The distinction between and itself empirical, not transcendental or metaphysical (Quine 1953). That is, to be operative, this distinction must actually be drawn by an observer, located somewhere in social structure, at a particular time and place. The distinction does not draw itself, not drawn by logical necessity, and can also be drawn in different changing ways. Admitting normative/empirical distinction an one to acknowledge that world does not, all by itself, fall apart into and matters. Phrased differently, neither the nor the normative constitutes natural kinds or universal essences, valid in all possible worlds, for all possible observers (Fuchs, forthcoming). Rather, distinction a cultural and historical variable and construct. History of and objectivity suggests that one accomplishment of Scientific Revolution was to separate matters of fact from other affairs (Shapin and Schaffer 1985 ). Related distinctions were also hammered out at this time, including subjective/objective, or primary/secondary qualities (Daston 1992). These accomplishments were by no means natural, evident, necessary, or uncontroversial. To contrary, they were contested outcomes of conflicts over emergence of a new culture, modern science, as opposed to scholastic philosophy, popular magic, and religious morality. While normative/empirical distinction not inscribed in very fabric of reality, it a useful pragmatic tool for separating is from ought to be. By empirical we mean no special scientific method, observational technique, or data-processing instrument. Much less does empirical have anything to do with numbers, statistics, or positivism. In this understanding, irlcludes theoretical, irlsofar as theories of a given resonate with, and are sensitive to, its information. On this account, much philosophy not empirical, since its constructs are developed by conceptual analysis, not research. Likewise, analytical core of neoclassical economics not empirical, either, insofar as it includes counterfactuals, such as rationality. Empirical anything for which a has a protocol of decidability. Such protocols determine which kinds of questions, puzzles, and problems a given can solve with its current means and tools. This does not imply that this has actually solved these problems, or even that it will surely do so in future. Rather, decidability means that a at a given time and point in its history, confronts puzzles and problems that it confident belong to its current domain, as opposed to problems that are outside of its current capacities. Medawar (1969) sees as of soluble. The nonproblems of one may, however, fall into domain of a different scierlce, or a different culture say, an art or religion. For example, contemporary particle physics confident it can decipher fundamental building blocks of matter, but it has no protocol for deciding whether universe has any intentional meaning or purpose. In contrast, Aristotelian *For very useful suggestions, we thank CS editors.