Abstract
Social utilities account for agent preferences and, thus, can characterize complex interrelationships, such as cooperation, compromise, negotiation, and altruism, that can exist between agents. Satisficing game theory, which is based on social utilities, offers a framework within which to design sophisticated multiagent systems. Key features of this approach are: a) an N-agent system may be represented by a 2N-dimensional Bayesian network, called a praxeic network; b) the theory accommodates a notion of situational altruism (a willingness to defer to others in a controlled way if so doing would actually benefit others under the condition that others wish to take advantage of such largesse); and c) satisficing games admits a protocol for effective negotiation between agents who, though interested in their own welfare, are also willing to give some deference to others. Three applications are presented. The first two involve well-known two-person games: the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes, and the third is a simulated uninhabited aerial vehicle scenario.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part C (Applications and Reviews)
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
