Social Stability and Catastrophe Risk: Lessons From the Stag Hunt

Abstract

Had the destruction and suffering visited upon New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina been the result of a terrorist attack, it would have been very successful — not because of the number of innocent lives lost or amount of property destroyed, but rather because of the breakdown of the social order. What better possible outcome could a terrorist envision than planting seeds of doubt regarding the willingness and ability of individuals and government to fulfill their respective roles in the `social contract'? In this article, we employ a class of symmetric, ordinal 2 × 2 games — including the frequently studied Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt — to model the stability of the social contract in the face of catastrophic changes in social relations. In two alternative analyses, we find that the Stag Hunt provides a relatively stable and efficient normative model for society. These results offer useful insights into the pre- and post-event management of catastrophe risks, especially large-scale terrorist attacks designed to disrupt the social order.