Abstract
This essay suggests that the Chilean constitution-making process should not pre-determine the social policies that political institutions should implement to respond to existing social demands. Instead, the authors argue that constitutional designers should aim to guide and facilitate those policies’ approval. The authors’ proposal provides an alternative to adopting a strong model of social rights enforcement by suggesting a ‘weak-strong’ social rights model. The model includes a mandatory ‘by law’ clause, a specific timeframe for adopting legislation, constitutional principles guiding the social policy reforms, and providing for the possibility of a particular form of judicial review.
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