Social Psychologists and the Method of the Instinctivists

Abstract

O NE criticism of the theory of instincts as the basis of human behavior was that lists of instincts were based almost entirely upon the opinions and chance observations of psychologists rather than upon objective investigation. While the discarding of lists of instincts undoubtedly has marked a step in advance in the theory of social psychology, another and similar laxity remains-the tendency of social psychologists to create in lieu of instincts lists of wishes, dispositions, desires, prepotent reflexes and the like. In character these desires-to use one term for all-are conceived of as different from instincts. There is fairly general agreement that they are general impulses to action, modifiable by social pressure, but that they cause a craving for satisfaction. Thus Thomas states that while he has assumed that it is possible to produce any desirable and values, this assumption is justified only if the individual has which cannot avoid response to a class of stimulations which society is able to apply to him, and he proceeds to list his four desires.' Bogardus, in adopting Thomas' classification as one portion of his own classification, states, All the natural impulses, the feelings, emotions, sentiments may become organized into what W. I. Thomas calls 'wishes.' 2 And again, four basic urges constitute the individual's chief equipment at birth.3 Of the attitudes listed by Bogardus, three are definitely called innate and it is implied that all are so. Dunlap, while he regards his as innate, states also that they are modifiable and lead to secondary desires.4 Williams speaks of his dispositions as instinctive, but with a modifiable aspect.5 Allport believes that very complex acts are developed from the prepotent reflexes through social conditioning.6 It seems safe to assume that all of these writers are driving toward an analysis of the same thing-the underlying or innate capacities which furnish the individual's drive toward activity. The implication is that the human being is not generally active, but that his nature demands certain types-although not specific forms-of satisfaction. But when these and other men who have recently published social psychologies put down the various innate elements which they find in human nature, there is anything but agreement, as witness the lists given ih Table I. There are at least twenty-three different desires given by these six writers. Only one, sex, is accepted by all (Thomas includes sex under the desire for response). The various lists range from four to fourteen as the total number of desires. These lists as they now stand are open to the following serious objections. I. No method is stated by which desires were discovered. This means in all probability that no objective method was