Abstract
The paper discusses an alternative approach to social choice problems. By means of a distance function, a representation of a social preference is derived as an optimal compromise in the sense of minimizing the sum of the distances to the individual utility functions. It is shown that metrics are not suitable as distance functions in this framework. Using a quadratic distance function as an example, the utilitarian social welfare functional is characterized as an optimal compromise. The informational requirements necessary for the consistency of this optimal compromise are examined.
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