Abstract
The relation between social power and negative freedom is examined, assuming Stoppino’s formal classification of power and a ‘pure’ negative conception of freedom. The aim is twofold: first, to clarify whether and (if so) in what ways a person’s negative freedom is diminished when others exercise power over her, thus arriving at an exhaustive analysis of the power-freedom relation on the basis of Stoppino’s classification; secondly, to correct the common misconception according to which a person’s pure negative freedom is diminished only by violence or its threat, and not by less evident forms of power.
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