Social Origins of Dictatorships: Elite Networks and Political Transitions in Haiti

Suresh Naidu,Lauren E Young,James A Robinson

doi:10.1017/s0003055421000289

Suresh Naidu, Lauren E Young + Show 1 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055421000289

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Abstract

Existing theories of democratic reversals emphasize that elites mount actions like coups when democracy is particularly threatening to their interests. However, existing theory has been largely silent on the role of elite social networks, which interact with economic incentives and may facilitate antidemocratic collective action. We develop a model where coups generate rents for elites and show that the effort an elite puts into a coup is increasing in their network centrality. We empirically explore the model using an original dataset of Haitian elite networks that we linked to firm-level data. We show that central families were more likely to be accused of participating in the 1991 coup against the democratic Aristide government. We then find that the retail prices of staple goods that are imported by such elites differentially increase during subsequent periods of nondemocracy. Our results suggest that elite social structure is an important factor in democratic reversals.

Highlights

B etween 1960 and 2010, 51 countries experienced a total of 71 democratic reversals (Acemoglu et al 2019)
Is this correlation driven by omitted variables, or does it hold up to the inclusion of controls for other social, political, and economic characteristics of families? To assess the relationship between centrality and coup participation conditional on other relevant characteristics, we estimate the following specification: Coupi 1⁄4 βCentralityi þ ηFamilySizei þ Social0iθ þ Economic0iγ þ εi, where Coupi is an indicator for whether a family participated in the 1991 coup
In this article we have developed and empirically explored a theory of the role of elite social networks in coups against democracy

Summary

INTRODUCTION

B etween 1960 and 2010, 51 countries experienced a total of 71 democratic reversals (Acemoglu et al 2019). Our data allow us to examine the relationship between centrality and coup contribution (we drop “accused” on) conditional on economic interests, social characteristics, and past political involvement. We use a dynamic panel data model to estimate the differential effect of an autocratic spell from 2004 to 2006 on the retail prices of products imported by families who contributed to the 1991 coup. Though we only have rich data on elite networks in Haiti the model does make predictions about the types of elite social networks that would tend to enable democratic reversals. This article adds to our understanding of democratic reversals by highlighting the importance of elite social networks in facilitating action against democracy and redistribution. We contribute new evidence to arguments that democratic reversals are organized to protect the economic interests of a wealthy elite. The analysis that we present brings new micro-level empirical evidence to help explain how elites are able to pursue their economic interests through the creation of monopoly-granting autocratic regimes

BACKGROUND

RESULTS

Scaling parameter δ

CONCLUSION

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT