Abstract
AbstractThis paper investigates the linear‐quadratic social control problem for mean field systems with unmodeled dynamics and multiplicative noise. The objective of each agent is to optimize the social cost in the worst‐case disturbance. We first analyze the centralized strategies by the person‐by‐person optimality and then construct an auxiliary zero‐sum game according to mean field approximations. By solving the auxiliary problem subject to consistency conditions, we design a set of decentralized strategies, which is further shown to have asymptotic robust social optimality.
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