Abstract
AbstractA theoretical framework is introduced to model social norms using the tools of psychological game theory. In the prisoner's dilemma game, a preference for norm compliance can lead to cooperation arising with a positive probability, and if this preference is sufficiently strong, occurring as a pure strategy equilibrium. Thus, cooperation can arise as a social norm in a one‐shot prisoner's dilemma game without repeated play, communication, or sanctions.
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