Social Motivation and Charismatic Leadership in National Socialism

Abstract

Martin Broszat Social Motivation and Charismatic Leadership in National Socialism Introduction In the recent historical literature on National Socialism, we find a growing number of studies that seek to illuminate various aspects of the internal structure and functioning of the Hitler regime, which are not accounts that simply document and record the actual facts of history.1 Such studies have often been prompted by newly discovered source material that calls into question previously held views on the Nazi regime and suggests the need to rethink or reinterpret certain key concepts, or indeed to revise them entirely. By their very nature, specialized studies of this kind, which have also appeared in this journal and other publications of the Institute for Contemporary History, can by and large claim to offer only partial interpretations of the general fabric of the Nazi regime from the perspective of their particular field of inquiry. It therefore seems fitting on the occasion of this special issue celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Institute’s foundation to attempt to highlight at least some of the central problems of interpretation concerning the internal structure and functioning of the Nazi regime. For much of what follows, I shall be drawing on my book about the “Hitler state,” which was published a year ago.2 Yet, the present essay will address issues that were only hinted at, and not systematically explored, in that book, which focused primarily on the institutional structure of 1 To take the most important new historical studies that have appeared since 1966, this applies in particular to Hans Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich. Mit ausgewählten Quellen zur nationalsozialistischen Beamtenpolitik, Stuttgart 1966; Alan S. Milward, Die deutsche Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1945, Stuttgart 1966; Heinz Höhne, Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Die Geschichte der SS, Gütersloh 1967; Dietmar Petzina, Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich. Der nationalsozialistische Vierteljahrsplan, Stuttgart 1968; Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik 1933–1938, Frankfurt a. M./Berlin 1968; David Schoenbaum, Die braune Revolution. Eine Sozialgeschichte des Dritten Reiches, Cologne/Berlin 1968; Peter Diehl-Thiele, Partei und Staat im Dritten Reich. Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von NSDAP und allgemeiner innerer Staatsverwaltung 1933–1945, Munich 1969; Peter Hüttenberger, Die Gauleiter. Studie zum Wandel des Machtgefüges in der NSDAP, Stuttgart 1969; Reinhard Bollmus, Das Amt Rosenberg und seine Gegner. Studien zum Machtkampf im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem, Stuttgart 1970. 2 See Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung , Munich 1969. 212 Martin Broszat Nazi rule. The main problem that will be addressed here is how the social promise and social roots of the regime, as distinct from – though ultimately, of course, not divorced from – its power-political and constitutional evolution, are to be understood , and how this can be reconciled with the absolute leadership of Hitler and the ideology of National Socialism. The Social Promise of National Socialism In light of the popular support that National Socialism enjoyed even before the Party came to power, especially among the German middle classes, we must ask not only whether these social classes were ideologically predisposed to National Socialism, but also whether they were manipulated by the power of National Socialist propaganda. Naturally, the question about the real drive for social change behind National Socialism is equally important. However skilful and suggestive their propaganda was, Hitler and his Party could not simply create the fertile grounds for an effective appeal to the masses. Moreover, in the atmosphere of panic generated by the economic crisis, it took more than the traditional anti-democratic ideology and propaganda of the German nationalist opposition to kick-start a radical, national mass movement. In Germany, to the surprise of many contemporaries, the economic crisis, which in objective terms meant the impoverishment and proletarianization of broad sections of the population, gave little or no impetus to Marxist socialism, and did not necessarily produce class warriors and Communists, but rather a far greater number of National Socialists . It can therefore be surmised that large sections of the population saw the Hitler movement as the best answer to their simultaneous need for continuity and change. Marxist theory, which diagnosed National Socialism as the last refuge of a dying capitalism confronted by the threat of...