Social Justice and the Normativity of Morality

Abstract

The question: Why, if at all, is justice first virtue of social institutions? is one of chief questions of current political philosophy. But political philosophers have not asked: Why should societies strive to be just? In answer, this paper argues that societies should strive for social justice because unless they do so, morality will lack normativity for most of its members. Call this the undermining morality explanation. The paper first considers and tries to rebut three alternative views: a Rawlsian explanation from finality condition; Hegelian explanation from value of reconciling people to their social world; and a Frankfurt-school solidarity explanation, which is from value of achieving universal societal solidarity. The paper then argues for undermining morality explanation, on grounds that (1) if a society does not strive for social justice, it will not provide a majority of its members with self-respect necessary for valuing themselves and all other people as human; (2) that if a majority of society's members cannot so value themselves and others, then for them morality lacks normativity: requiring force; and (3) if morality lacks normativity for most of its members, then evils which morality is designed to reduce and eliminate will beset society. The paper then shows why avoiding causing those evils is obligatory for society, and offers reasons for thinking that this explanation is superior to its three rivals.