Abstract
The present study examined the effects of social feedback (praise and criticism) as well as opponent's strategy on the cooperation of 80 like-sexed pairs who played 40 trials of a Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Feedback was seen by Ss as administered by a peer or E and was either praise or criticism. There were five feedback conditions: Peer-praise, E-praise, Peer-criticism, E-criticism, and a neutral control condition. The opponent's strategy was programmed by E to be either Honest-Cooperative, Honest-Competitive, Dishonest-Cooperative, or Dishonest-Competitive. Analysis indicated that feedback was generally effective in increasing cooperation beyond that in the control group. However, with a competitive opponent, only E-praise led to increased cooperation. It was suggested that the clarity of the feedback agent's role is crucial and that ambiguous motives may diminish the effectiveness of his feedback.
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