Social Epistemology: Descriptive and Normative

Abstract

This chapter offers a conception of social epistemology for those who are not already committed. It aims to present a conception of social epistemology that properly acknowledges both the normative and the descriptive dimensions of our knowledge communities. The chapter deals with a brief discussion of the point of and motivation behind a distinctly “social” epistemology. It suggests how social epistemology looks from the vantage point of those who take this picture seriously. The chapter utilises “epistemic subject” to refer to the sort of entity of whom we can intelligibly ascribe knowledge and other epistemic states. It highlights the various roles that epistemic subjects play in acquiring, processing, storing, transmitting, or assessing information. The chapter provides the rationale for a distinctly social epistemology: social epistemology ought to be the systematic investigation into the epistemic significance of other minds. It shows that the pursuit of social epistemology is the attempt to come to terms with the epistemic significance of other minds.