Social dilemma based on reputation and successive behavior

Abstract

We propose a cooperative evolution model in which successive behaviors influence reputation. There are two mechanisms to form reputation. One is enhancing the reputation of players who cooperate insistently, and reducing it when they defect continuously. The other is increasing reputation when defection is transformed into cooperation, and decreasing when cooperation is turned into defection. These two reputation formation mechanisms are simulated on the weak prisoner's dilemma game. We use a weighted average Fermi equation to describe the probability of players learning the strategy of a randomly selected neighbor. The results show that, under these two mechanisms, both the reward for reputation and emphasis on it have an impact on the cooperation. We find that encouraging “C after C” is better for cooperation than encouraging “C after D”, when people attach importance to reputation to a certain extent. Before reaching that threshold, however, encouraging “C after D” is better when reputation reward is large.