Social costs of public service obligation routes—calculating subsidies of regional flights in Norway

Abstract

In this note we describe an iterative procedure of how to estimate unit costs per leg of a public service obligation (PSO) route network if certain data is publicly available. The aim of this approach is to make judgments in benchmarking and in regulation if revenues, costs and profits (or losses) per flight and its distribution among these route networks are typical compared to carriers serving networks under a competitive regime. Particularly this note aims to set a reference for the question, if market or bargaining powers are abused and to which extent. This work is thus especially important for PSO cases where a particular network cannot be operated in a profitable manner; therefore, its routes are offered to monopoly providers in a bidding competition and (in most cases) the service needs to be publicly subsidized. We shall apply the procedure on origin-destination matrices from tender documents published by the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications. The Ministry covers incurred losses produced by the bidding and winning carrier. As a first result we can observe that the PSO allocations show indications of an inefficient allocation process reflected in more than three-fold quoted costs on PSO routes above estimated market levels.