Abstract
A fundamental problem in governing natural resources is how to design institutions, particularly property rights regimes, that support sustainable use and management of common property resources. Privatization of natural resources was a widespread solution to the “tragedy of the commons” during the 1980s and 1990s. But many such efforts failed to achieve sustainable use of resources, and policymakers are now experimenting with new types of policy interventions. We examine recent changes in pastoral institutions and their outcomes regarding resource-use rights and the sustainability of resource use in China and Kyrgyzstan. Interpreting changing property rights as a process of social construction, we examine altered rules and rights relations and the ensuing changes in legal correlates between various actors in selected choice settings. The article contributes to the literature regarding the impacts of such reforms on property rights and their development in pastoral contexts.
Highlights
Ever since publication of Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968), there has been extensive scientific and political debate over the role of institutions in managing natural resources, the major concern being the relationship between institutions and environmental protection due to increasing demand for natural resources and environmental services (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003)
Consequent problems due to privatization arising in many countries, including China and Kyrgyzstan, shifted the focus of research towards micro-level analysis of institutional change and the nature of property rights
Using the example of land, he argues that property rights are the result of a social construction process in which social meaning and a social role are assigned to a physical object, framing “[...] how humans occupy it, how they use it, and how they secure it for their own gain” (Bromley, 1996: 22)
Summary
Ever since publication of Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968), there has been extensive scientific and political debate over the role of institutions in managing natural resources, the major concern being the relationship between institutions and environmental protection due to increasing demand for natural resources and environmental services (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003). An initial line of reasoning suggested that weakly defined or poorly enforced property rights could explain the overexploitation of common resources. Bromley’s social-construction perspective is largely based on experience from Western European counties and the United States Can this concept be helpful for analysing changing institutional arrangements in Asian transformational contexts?. We address this question by examining the experiences of China and Kyrgyzstan, as illustrative case studies, reflecting on how institutional design has affected resource-use rights and sustainable use of. Yu and Kasymov: Social Construction of Pastureland grassland there Both countries have been experiencing rapid transition in natural resource management, driven by environmental problems – including land degradation and desertification – market integration, and changing forms of governance (Bichsel et al 2010; Yang and Li 2015). Our study is intended to contribute towards the ongoing discourse on natural-resource management under transition (Gatzweiler and Hagedorn 2001; Otto et al 2016)
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