Social Cognitive Development from an Evolutionary Perspective

Abstract

Humans are among the most social of mammals; they transmit information to group members and across generations with great fidelity. We contend, as others have (e.g., Alexander, The human revolution: behavioural and biological perspectives on the origins of modern humans, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, pp. 455–513; Dunbar, Annu Rev Anthropol 32:163–181, 2003; Hare, Annu Rev Anthropol 40:293–309, 2011), that it was changes in social cognition over hominin evolution that was the driving force in human intelligence. Moreover, the origins of humans’ social nature and cognition are found in infancy and childhood, placing social cognitive development at center stage in understanding the evolution of the human mind. Humans have a fierce bias for orienting toward social stimuli beginning very shortly after birth, as outlined by our discussion on newborns’ attention to social stimuli such as biological motion, facial expressions, and eye gaze. Beyond the neonatal period, we go on to discuss the development of infants and young children’s ability to view other people as intentional agents and perspective taking. Given that viewing others as intentional agents is a foundational ability for effective social learning, we outline how the nature of children’s social learning changes as they enter childhood by shifting their attention to the behavior of others and begin reproducing others’ actions, often based on their assumed intentions. Lastly, we contrast the review of the development of human social cognition during the early years of life with the social cognitive abilities of humans’ closest genetic relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and speculate why such a unique cognitive system may have evolved.