Social categorization and the truly false consensus effect.

Abstract

The false consensus effect involves adequate inductive reasoning and egocentric biases. To detect truly false consensus effects (TFCEs), we correlated item endorsements with the differences between estimated and actual consensus within Ss. In Experiment 1, Ss overgeneralized from themselves to gender in-groups and to the overall population, but not to gender out-groups. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated intuitive understanding of consensus bias. Another person's choices were inferred from that person's population estimates or estimates about the gender in-group. In Experiment 4, Ss inferred that consensus estimates for a behavior were higher among people who were willing to engage in that behavior than among those who were not. Implications of these findings for general induction, social categorization, and the psychological processes underlying TFCEs are discussed. When, for example, Freud. . . got hold of a simple but significant fact he would feel, and know [italics added ], that it was an example of something general or universal. . . that is the way the mind of a genius works. (Jones, 1953, p. 66) [Projection is] not essentially different from the tendency to assume naively that others feel or react in the same manner as we ourselves do. (Homey, 1939, p. 26)