Abstract
Real kinds, both natural and social categories, are characterized by rich inductive potential. They have relatively stable sets of conceptually independent projectable properties. Somewhat surprisingly, even some purely social categories (e.g., ethnicity, gender, political orientation) show such multiple projectability. The article explores the origin of the inductive richness of social categories and concepts. I argue that existing philosophical accounts provide only a partial explanation, and mechanisms of boundary formation and stabilization must be brought into view for a more comprehensive account of inductively rich social categories.
Highlights
This article addresses a puzzle concerning social kinds
Several social kinds—from ethnic groups and professions to political orientations—are characterized by rich inductive potential. They have relatively stable sets of conceptually independent projectable properties. Why do these clusters form, why is there such clotting in the social world? I argue that existing philosophical accounts cannot fully explain the inductive potential of many social kinds
I propose that new a social kind and its “thingness” often result from processes of boundary formation, which can be pictured as existing differences being stitched together or coalescing into new distinct categories
Summary
This article addresses a puzzle concerning social kinds. Just like natural kinds, several social kinds—from ethnic groups and professions to political orientations—are characterized by rich inductive potential. Likewise, identifying an animal as a tiger gives good reasons to expect it has four legs, stripes, and DNA sequences characteristic of tigers This property is what Godman (2015) calls multiple projectability: members of real kinds have numerous (perhaps innumerable) properties in common, and they enable a broad range of empirical generalizations. Many substance concepts utilized outside the physical and chemical sciences would not satisfy the criteria of natural kindhood for traditional essentialist or nomological theories of natural kinds They can, manifest multiple projectability and serve a similar role in scientific inference. In this sense, it is possible that biological, social, and behavioral categories may be called real kinds and the concepts referring to them, substance concepts.
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