Social Backgrounds as Predictors of Votes On State Courts of Last Resort: the Case of Sex Discrimination

Abstract

HE VIABILITY of the social background approach as a means by which to explain judicial behavior has been an issue of considerable scholarly debate. The internal logic of the theory remains sound: shared social and political traits reflect similar socialization processes and life experiences, which in turn produce similar attitudes and ultimately behavior (votes). Several different kinds of criticisms of this approach have been levied. For one thing, social background factors have not proven to be particularly effective means by which to explain judicial behavior. The conceptual criticisms are perhaps more serious. For example, exclusive attention to social backgrounds ignores the effects of several important institutional factors such as attention to precedent, judicial independence, and the bond which exists among judges (Grossman 1966). Goldman and Sarat (1978: 374) claim that background traits are too crude to be linked to attitudes, values, and roles; it is impossible to draw causal connections between background characteristics and votes (see also Gibson 1978). Furthermore, while the particular life experiences of a given jurist will have obvious implications for attitude formation and decision making, this link as important as it may be on an individual basis becomes hopelessly strained when these personal attributes are aggregated for often hundreds of judges and thousands of votes. Despite these criticisms, social background theory has demonstrated its resilience, inspired most recently by the work of Tate (1981) and Carp and Rowland (1983) among others. Of special significance is Tate's argument for strengthening the theoretical link between backgrounds, values, and behavior (the Achilles' heel of background research): It may be that attitudes reflecting values and role perceptions, the intervening variables ostensibly excluded from attribute models, are so closely linked in a causal sense to voting that one can serve as an operational indicator of the other. ... If votes and attitudes are so closely linked that one may be inferred from the other, it would appear that for most analytical purposes they may be indistinguishable (p. 365). The conclusion would appear to be that the social background approach remains viable, yet is not without limitations. Social backgrounds are indeed important, yet a comprehensive model of judicial behavior would have