SOCIAL ASPECTS OF YOUTH RELIGIOUS CULTURE AS A FACTOR OF SOCIAL STABILITY IN KAZAKHSTAN AND RUSSIA: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Abstract

As of this time, the religious behavior of young people, the specifics of their religious practices and their general attitude to religion have not been adequately studied. The same fully applies to the influence of youth religious culture on the religious environment. Meanwhile, a better understanding of the religiosity level among young people and its specific features would have produced a more balanced and more adequate religious policy and helped preserve interconfessional harmony and stability in the post-Soviet space. In the course of our studies we defined the level of religiosity by the extent to which the sacral duties (i.e., fasting, praying, pilgrimage to holy places and voluntary offerings) were observed. The attitude of the younger generation to religious extremism was also examined. We based our research on the results of public opinion polls among the young people in the cities of Turkestan (Kazakhstan) and Nizhnekamsk (Tatarstan, Russian Federation). It turned out that the level of religiosity (as per the above parameters) among the young people of Tatarstan was lower by almost two times than that in Kazakhstan, yet the type of their religious culture does not negatively affect religious stability. The high and ever-growing level of religiosity among all population groups (younger generation included) is present in the southern regions of Kazakhstan (the Turkestan Region being no exception), which are seen as a zone of high risk of religious extremism. The results of recent studies, however, confirmed that current social instability is not rooted in youth radicalism: the level and nature of religious activity in this population group are not a threat to religious stability in the region. Indeed, the majority of the respondents in the Turkestan Region had no personal experience of dealing with radical religious extremists; a smaller part (a third) of the respondents believes that the threat is real. In Tatarstan, on the other hand, the share of respondents who are aware of the threat of religious extremist activity and fear it is nearly 40%; the share of those who admit that religious extremists are present among the republic’s younger generation is even higher (81%). While the majority of the respondents assessed the religious situation in Tatarstan as fairly stable, 40% remained convinced that religious extremists may destabilize the religious environment in the region. Since the level of religiosity among the polled young people in Tatarstan is nearly half the size of that in Kazakhstan, it can be defined as a zone of low youth religious activity. The level of religiosity in Turkestan makes it a zone of average religious activity. Comparative analysis of the religiosity level among the younger generation helped us identify certain factors that negatively affect interconfessional stability in Kazakhstan and Russia and suggest an efficient religious policy.