Abstract
ABSTRACT We conduct the Krupka – Weber norm-elicitation game in a setting with contractual incompleteness and find that the method is not robust to subjects in different roles and treatments. We disclose bystanders’ norm ratings to trading parties in an information treatment. The two parties in the information treatment differ in rating the appropriateness of choices, and these role differences are rooted in an egocentric focus on bystanders’ ratings. We also find that the mechanism enhances their normative standard and selection of more pro-social choices.
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