Sobre el rol propedéutico de las intuiciones desde una perspectiva racionalista naturalista

Abstract

The main target of this paper is to propose a preparatory learning role of rational intuitions, in order to defend a hybrid proposal between a priori and a posteriori epistemic access. Rational intuitions must be informed empirically, and discarded when there is evidence against them, when empirical evidence shows that rational intuition is wrong, so any belief guided by it would also be wrong. It is argued that rational intuitions play an important propaedeutic role: they help to understand different modal scenarios through counterfactual exemplifications. This is not opposed to the cultural variation of intuitions, therefore a variable intuitional reliability is proposed. This proposal includes intuitions as fallible and as not truth conducive: it is not the goal of intuitions to trace the truth of a proposition, but to help understand the hypothetical scenarios that may be relevant in different areas.