Abstract
In standard decision theory, rational agents are objective, keeping their beliefs independent from their desires. Such agents are the basis for current computational models of Theory of Mind (ToM), but the accuracy of these models are unknown. Do people really think that others do not let their desires color their beliefs? In two experiments we test whether people think that others engage in wishful thinking. We find that participants do think others believe that desirable events are more likely to happen, and that undesirable ones are less likely to happen. However, these beliefs are not well calibrated as people do not let their desires influence their beliefs in the task. Whether accurate or not, thinking that others wishfully think has consequences for reasoning about them. We find one such consequence—people learn more from an informant who thinks an event will happen despite wishing it was otherwise. People’s ToM therefore appears to be more nuanced than the current rational accounts in that it allows other’s desires to directly affect their subjective probability of an event.
Highlights
The results from the 3-PoV condition indicate that people’s Theory of Mind (ToM) includes a direct “wishful thinking” link. This is consistent with the qualitative predictions of the optimistic ToM (oToM) model, unlike rational theories of mind (rToM) models where beliefs and desires are a priori independent
That is to say that Experiment 1 represents a situation where wishful thinking is present in ToM reasoning but absent in actual behavior—people think others will behave wishfully when, they do not
Current computational models of theory of mind are built upon the assumption that beliefs are a priori independent of desires
Summary
In the four baseline trials, the marble’s drop position varied and participants were asked, “What do you think Josh thinks is the chance that the marble lands in the bin with the purple/orange box?” Participants’ responses were recorded on a continuous slider with endpoints labeled “Certainly Will” and “Certainly Won’t.”. After seeing the Galton board with marblex indicated with a blue arrow, participants were asked two questions sequentially First they were asked, “What do you think Josh believes is the chance that the marble will land on the {$/−$} and he’ll {win/lose} $1?” with the response recorded on the same slider as the baseline trials with endpoints labeled “Certainly Will” and “Certainly Won’t.”. The participants were given a $1 bonus initially and instructed that one trial at random would be selected to augment their current bonus, that is, they could gain or lose $1
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