Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack and Defense: A Review

Hang Zhang,Bo Liu,Hongyu Wu

doi:10.1109/access.2021.3058628

Hang Zhang, Bo Liu + Show 1 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2021.3058628

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Abstract

Recent advances in the cyber-physical smart grid (CPSG) have enabled a broad range of new devices based on the information and communication technology (ICT). However, these ICT-enabled devices are susceptible to a growing threat of cyber-physical attacks. This paper performs a thorough review of the state-of-the-art cyber-physical security of the smart grid. By focusing on the physical layer of the CPSG, this paper provides an abstracted and unified state-space model, in which cyber-physical attack and defense models can be effectively generalized. The existing cyber-physical attacks are categorized in terms of their target components. We then discuss several operational and informational defense approaches that present the current state-of-the-art in the field, including moving target defense, watermarking, and data-driven approaches. Finally, we discuss challenges and future opportunities associated with the smart grid cyber-physical security.

Highlights

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are smart systems that include engineered interacting networks of physical and computational components [1]
A cyber-physical smart grid (CPSG) relies on the cooperation of both cyber and physical layer functionalities
This paper provides a cyber-physical power system (CPPS) operation model and addresses the associated vulnerabilities targeted by an attacker

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are smart systems that include engineered interacting networks of physical and computational components [1]. Choeum et al [78] proposed an LR attack against the conservation voltage reduction (CVR) in distribution systems with DERs. The presented adversary injects malicious load data into the advanced metering infrastructure network and misleads the CVR to come up with an abnormal control signal for the voltage regulator and smart inverter set points. A novel line outage masking attack was proposed [87]–[91], where an adversary attacks an area by physically disconnecting some lines from the attacked area (i.e., remotely open the circuit breakers) to occur shortterm damage like voltage violation and line overflow, and mask the measurements within the attacked area by DoS or FDI attacks Such attacks combine both control and measurement layer attacks to cause immediate failure and block the operator’s awareness at the same time, which may lead to cascading failures. Several state-of-the-art cyber-physical defense approaches in the CPSG, including securing measurement sensors, model and algorithmic enhancement, data-driven approaches, moving target defense, and watermarking, are reviewed

TEMPORALLY- AND SPATIALLY-RELEVANT DETECTION

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

CONCLUSION