Slipstreaming for Public Sector Reform: How Enterprising Public Sector Leaders Navigate Institutional Inertia

Abstract

Abstract We situate public sector leaders as actors who deal with competing institutional demands, and examine how public sector leaders can facilitate reform implementation in the face of institutional inertia in a transitional setting, Bangladesh public administration. Based on 32 interviews with current and former Bangladeshi civil servants and local public administration experts supported by secondary analysis of government documents, our evidence shows that public sector leaders operating within multiple logics are agentic in contributing to reform. However, these leaders also become constrained by institutional pressures that threaten their legitimacy and may face sanctions for pursuing local changes. Although public sector leaders typically engage in resistance to reform, our evidence shows that public sector leaders can create enterprising avenues of change, adeptly exercising agency and utilizing existing institutional logics as a conduit to introducing a new institutional order. Our principal contribution is to identify slipstreaming as a means by which institutional actors negotiate institutional logics and facilitate change despite institutional inertia.