Slippery slope arguments: a case study on Hugh Lafollette's views

Abstract

One of the most popular tools for evaluating ideas in ethics is slippery slope arguments. The simple formulation of them is in the following form: 1) If we permit the action X, then this gradually results in performing action Y. 2) Action Y is morally wrong. 3) We should not permit action X (Consequence). Moral philosophers have discussed their accurate structure, various forms and their validity. One of moral philosophers in contemporary era that did search about this subject is Hugh Lafollette. He believes that central element in these arguments is in their first premise, but not specified and that is the probability of the consequence, for this reason, probability should be inserted in their consequences. Not inserting the probability in consequence of the arguments is a kind of neglecting - and we think it is a fallacy - and inserting it results in annihilating the convincing of them. In view point of him, if any argument is formally similar to slippery slope arguments, but there isn't the element of probability in it, the argument isn't slippery slope argument, but it is straightforward induction generalization or straightforward causal argument that both are valid. Considering the Lafollette's analyses, we can say when the argument consists of probability, the argument is invalid and when it consists of necessity, it is valid, but it is no longer slippery slope argument. This essay first, introduces Lafollette's views, and then indicates the weakness of them, and defends of this idea that regarding some conditions, these arguments are valid and can be used in ethical debates.