Abstract
Between September 1945 and November 1946, up to 35,000 surrendered Japanese troops were assimilated into Lord Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command in the Netherlands East Indies. Although under the ultimate control of British officers,the Japanese retained their wartime unit structures, were led by their own officers and remained armed. As a measure of their acceptance by the British, one of them was recommended for the Distinguished Service Order in November 1945, only three months after the war’s end. The Japanese fought alongside the British despite the anger felt against them as the perpetrators of wartime atrocities and as a former enemy. These sentiments, however, did not prevent senior military personnel and politicians from using the Japanese to assist in the restoration of pre‐war European empires in Asia. Crucially,the United States government tacitly supported the use of the Japanese. Aware of the sensitivity of using former enemy troops, the British and Americans tried to conceal the extent of Japanese involvement. Their success in achieving this hid not just their own hypocrisy but also the important part played by the Japanese in securing Allied post‐war aims in Asia.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.