Slavery Overshadowed: Congress Debates Prohibiting the Atlantic Slave Trade to the United States, 1806-1807

Abstract

In December 1806, as Ninth Congress of United States convened in its second session, rumors of a frightful conspiracy in West circulated about Washington. The reports in following months implicated Aaron Burr, past vice president of United States (from 1801 to 1805) but already notorious, in part for killing Alexander Hamilton in a duel, as leader of plot. Over next several weeks, Americans in all regions read with great interest further details of Burr's alleged plans to stir southwestern states and territories to fight for independence from United States, aided by a foreign power such as Great Britain or Spain. At same time, press and word of mouth brought tidings of Napoleon's invasion of Prussia. In next few months Americans learned of Napoleon's Berlin Decree, announcing a blockade of Great Britain in retaliation for Britain's Orders in Council that had first proclaimed a blockade around Continent. Congressmen that winter debated bills of great importance, but their words drew less attention than developments in West and in Europe. One of those bills would prohibit importation of slaves into United States after January 1, 1808. This act, signed into law at end of session, had a great impact on American history.1 Yet Americans in 1806 and 1807 paid little attention to these historic debates, distracted as they were by doings of Burr and Napoleon. Their distraction tells us more about nature of early sectionalism and perception of other dangers in new Republic than does rhetoric ringing through halls of Congress.2 William Freehling, in his recent account of growth of America's sectional crisis, places end of African slave trade near heart of his interpretation. For Freehling, other early action so shaped later slavery controversy as did slave trade proscription. The restriction reduced black population growth in South, he argues, and thus diminished that section's representation in national government. The ban meant that states such as Kentucky and Missouri would face a permanent shortage of slave labor; that Virginia and Maryland would continue to be whitened as they exported excess slaves to Deep South; and that Old Northwest never would develop a slave system. As a result Border South would be less committed to slavery than Deep South, and Northwest would not be committed at all. For Freehling, the closure of African slave trade was probably most important slavery legislation Congress ever passed and among most important American laws on any subject.3 Freehling makes a powerful case for significance of effects of bill, but there is more to it than he recognizes, for debates leading to its passage themselves reveal depth of sectional feeling attached to slavery. Yet historians have devoted very little attention to legislative history of slave trade ban and even less to responses to bill outside of Congress. The congressional slave trade disputes of 1806-1807 exposed a dangerous form of American sectionalism and a willingness to tap its rhetoric. There was broad support from all regions for proscribing slave trade, but crafting of measure was riddled with sharp and revealing disputes in which feeling ran high between North and South. What was said in these debates, though not widely scrutinized at time, foreshadowed danger of engaging slavery question. According to Constitution, Congress could not prohibit foreign slave trade before year 1808, although it could impose a duty of up to ten dollars on each slave imported (Article I, Section 9). This controversial clause provoked emotional arguments during ratification debates, especially in North. From Massachusetts to Virginia, advocates of Constitution who opposed slave trade looked with hope to this provision: after all, Articles of Confederation set no date at which Congress could legislate in this area. …