Slaughter in the Forest: Roman Intelligence Mistakes in Germany

Abstract

The Roman military disaster in Germany in AD 9 has fascinated historicans for generations. Hundreds of scholars have questioned how a barbarian force could wipe out three crack Roman legions so easily, and whether this incident did indeed put to an end Rome's imperial dreams beyond the Rhine. This article will suggest that insufficent intelligence gathering played a large contributing factor to the Roman defeat. It was not ignorance of the geography which plagued the Romans; they knew exactly where they were going. The Roman commander Varus left his summer camp on the Weser and returned to his winter camp, taking with him the XVIIth, XVIIIth and the XIXth Legions, their equipment and all the other inhabitants of the camp. They never arrived. They were guided by a German chieftain whose intent was to lead an insurgency against Rome. Roman counterintelligence had not detected his true feelings, the extent of his popularity among other Germans, or the amount of discontent among Rome's German subjects. The uprising was a classic example of strategic surprise which caught the Roman off guard and changed the course of their foreign policy forever.