Abstract
This chapter explores the relationship between philosophical skepticism and the concerns of daily life. The aim is to show that function-first epistemology can augment an argument against skepticism. The force of the skeptic’s argument, as well as our desire to reject the skeptical conclusion, is explained in the following way: our need to share information pushes us to accept stricter epistemic standards that might logically end at skepticism, but practical factors encourage us to formulate standards that stop short of skepticism. This tension creates an area of indeterminacy in which controversies about skepticism take place. This chapter explains the persuasive power of skepticism while also explaining why skeptical worries do not (and should not) threaten our everyday knowledge.
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