Abstract
AbstractThis chapter considers two sorts of scepticism about the possibility of knowingly acting against one's practical judgment, or weakness of will. The Socratic view that weak behaviour is impossible overlooks the truth that human beings are subject to different sources of motivation: evaluative judgments and mere desires. A second kind of scepticism targets the common view that the difference between weakness and compulsion is that weak agents give into desires which they could resist. The chapter proposes a different understanding of the phenomena, according to which weakness exhibits a culpable failure of self-control. Culpability here does not presume that the agent was at the time able to resist, but only that she is open to criticism for her lack of self-control. This account allows for a distinction between weak and compulsive behaviour that is consistent both with scepticism about resistibility, and with important judgments of responsibility.
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