Abstract
According to a non-realist conception, the notion of truth is epistemically constrained: the anti-realist accepts one version or another of the Knowability Principle (‘Any true proposition is knowable’). There is, however, a well-known argument, first published by Frederic Fitch (1963), which seems to threaten the anti-realist position. Starting out from seemingly innocuous assumptions, Fitch claims to prove: if there is some true proposition which nobody knows to be true, then there is a true proposition which nobody can know to be true.
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