Abstract
Three uses of partial information games are considered, the situational use, the derivation of rules, and the derivation of conventional meaning. The possibility of probabilistic communication is introduced and modeled. The role of rules and general cognitive strategies is discussed in the context of partial information games. The requirement of common knowledge is also considered briefly in the context of static and evolutionary games.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
