Abstract

Accessing public Wi-Fi networks can be as dangerous as it is convenient. People who access a public Wi-Fi network should engage in self-protective behaviors to keep their data safe from malicious actors on the same network as well as persons looking over their shoulder, literally and proverbially. Using two independent research designs, we examined under what circumstances were people more likely to access an unsecured Wi-Fi network and engage in risky behavior on these networks. Findings from the first study, based on survey data, reveal that people who are more situationally aware are less likely to access personal accounts on public Wi-Fi, and more likely to cover their screen to prevent others from viewing personal information. Additionally, findings show that people with higher computer proficiencies are less likely to engage with public Wi-Fi. For the second study, our research team designed and deployed honeypot Wi-Fi networks. We found that people are more likely to access these unsecured, rogue networks in establishments with fewer on-duty employees and that do not offer legitimate public Wi-Fi. Additionally, the number of on-duty employees is associated with an increase in physical security behaviors, such as concealing a screen. We conclude by discussing how these findings can aid in reducing susceptibility to online victimization.

Highlights

  • Public Wi-Fi networks provide a convenient, cost-effective way for accessing the Internet in areas where a wired infrastructure is challenging

  • To answer the third hypothesis, we implemented a field study that allowed for the collection of public Wi-Fi network packet data across a chosen United States (US) state

  • We contribute to thecriminological literature by providing insight into whether users of public Wi-Fi networks are aware of the risks and use online and offline Victim Self-Protective Behavior (VSPB)

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Summary

Jordan Howell Georgia State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/ebcs_articles Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, and the Information Security Commons.

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