SIRC: A Secure Incentive Scheme for Reliable Cooperative Downloading in Highway VANETs

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a secure incentive scheme to achieve fair and reliable cooperative (SIRC) downloading in highway vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). SIRC can stimulate vehicle users to help download-and-forward packets for each other and consists of cooperative downloading and forwarding phase. During the cooperative downloading phase, SIRC utilizes “virtual checks” associated with the designated verifier signature to ensure fair and secure cooperation. Meanwhile, to minimize the payment risk of the client vehicle, partial prepayment strategy is adopted, i.e., the vehicles involved in downloading packets can only obtain part of the check before the client vehicle confirms the packet reception. During the cooperative forwarding phase, a profit-sharing model associated with an aggregating Camenisch–Lysyanskaya (CL) signature can stimulate cooperation and reduce the authentication overhead. In addition, we develop a reputation system to encourage cooperation and punish malicious vehicles. The aggregating CL signature and the symmetric cryptosystem are applied to resist various attacks, including injection/removing attack, free riding attack, submission refusal attack, and denial of service attacks. Extensive simulation results are given to show that the proposed SIRC can achieve a high download success rate and low average download delay with moderate cryptographic computation and communication overhead.