Sir Arthur Wauchope, the army, and the rebellion in Palestine, 1936

Abstract

This article will examine the fluctuations in British policy during the first phase of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, which lasted from April to October, 1936. It would now be purely academic to conjecture the fate of Palestinian Arab nationalism, had the 1936 rebellion been crushed at its onset-as the Army believed it could have done. But in 1936, the civil and military authorities in Palestine differed in their assessment of the genuineness of the rebellion and consequently over the methods best suited to end it. In 1936, the civil authority curbed the military, but in 1937, when a fresh outbreak of terrorism occurred, British policy makers were unanimous in their decision to give the army a free hand. At times during the crises which preceded World War II and during the War itself, the British Foreign Office regarded it in the British interest to foster a pro-British Pan-Arabism. But in 1936, the Foreign Office was as yet a mere spectator on the Palestinian scene, at most, a mediator. For some 15 years prior to the 1936 rebellion, Palestine had been the domain of the Colonial Office. This Department, and in particular its long-serving High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, could in 1936 look back on six years of relative peace, during which the delicate balance between the Arab and Jewish communities had been carefully nurtured. Thus, when highway murder was followed by urban riot in April 1936, the local administration at first dismissed these events as yet another of the periodic outbursts which beset Palestine from time to time-to be calmed perhaps by yet another impartial investigation by a British Royal Commission. In April 1936, the British Authorities could not possibly have foreseen the proportions the disturbances would assume. But even when it had become apparent that the Administration was faced by fullscale rebellion, accompanied by an Arab General Strike, the dilatory policies of London and Jerusalem ensured for the rebellion a momentum which would have been inconceivable, had British policy been consistent, united and firm in purpose. During the first month of the disturbances, British policy lacked central direction owing to the involvement of the Colonial Secretary in a financial scandal, which eventually led to the Minister's resignation at the end of May. His successor had perforce to rely heavily on the judgement of the High Commissioner, a man unwilling to jeopardize his admittedly substantial achievements with the two communities in Palestine. Consequently, more and more troops were called upon to re-inforce the Palestine garrison, while at the same time the High Commissioner limited their effectiveness, at times countermanding the orders of their officers. The result was mutual recrimination between the civil and military authorities and the ultimate condemnation of Wauchope by a Colonial Office which, on its own admission, had at the time accepted full responsibility for following his advice.